We study multiplayer games in which the participants have access to only limited randomness. This constrains both the algorithms used to compute equilibria (they should use little or no randomness) as well as the mixed strategies that the participants are capable of playing (these should be sparse). We frame algorithmic questions that naturally arise in this setting, and resolve several of them.
Introduction
Ever since Nash's work in 1951 [Nas51] and Morgenstern and von Neumann's treatise [MvN44] that introduced the subject, game theory has been one of the cornerstones of economic analysis. In recent years, game theory has increasingly become embedded into theoretical computer science. In particular, the field of algorithmic game theory has seen prolific contributions to areas such as auctions, mechanism design and congestion games.
Traditionally, designing algorithms for such games has been largely driven by the need to find equilibria time-efficiently. In this context, Chen and Deng [CD06] built on prior work [DP05, CD05, DGP06, GP06] and showed that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for the two-player game is complete for the PPAD class. This suggests that a polynomial-time algorithm is unlikely to exist. With Teng, Chen and Deng [CDT06] showed further that finding O(1/n Θ(1) )-approximate Nash equilibria is also PPAD-complete. In this paper, we study algorithms for finding equilibria and playing games randomness-efficiently. By "playing a game" we mean the actions a player must take to actually sample and play a strategy from a mixed strategy profile, which necessarily entails randomness. There is an immense body of literature in theoretical computer science devoted to addressing computational issues when limited or no randomness is available, and for the same reasons it makes sense to study games whose players have limited access to randomness. Moreover, as we will see below, limited randomness in games motivates some special classes of games that have arisen in other contexts thereby providing a viewpoint that we believe is helpful.
Limited randomness imposes two major constraints on players. Firstly, players with access to limited randomness are precluded from executing mixed strategies with large support since playing a mixed strategy with
Reusing randomness in multiple round games
In single-round games a randomness-limited player requires sparse strategies, but in multiple-round games, we would like to be able to "reuse" randomness across rounds. This is an orthogonal concern to that of reducing randomness within a single round.
Freund and Schapire [FS99] proposed an adaptive online algorithm for a T -round two-player zero-sum game with n strategies available to each. Executing the mixed strategies produced by their algorithm uses Ω(T log n) bits of randomness over T rounds, in the worst case. By making use of almost-pairwise independence, we show how to reuse randomness across rounds: it is possible to make do with just O(log n + log log T + log(1/ )) bits and achieve close to the same quality of approximation as in [FS99] . Theorem 1.3 Let M be the n×n-payoff matrix for a two-player zero-sum T -round game with entries in {0, 1}. For any < 1/2 and constant δ, there exists an online randomized algorithm R using O(log n + log log T + log(1/ )) random bits with the following property: for any arbitrary sequence Q 1 , . . . , Q T of mixed strategies played (adaptively) by the column player over T rounds, R produces a sequence of strategies S 1 , . . . , S T such that with probability at least 1 − δ:
M (P, Q i ) + O log n T +
Games with sparse equilibria
As we have discussed, players with limited access to randomness can only achieve equilibria that are sparse. We saw before that in the general setting, we are able to deterministically "sparsify" if we are willing to settle for -equilibria. The sparsity cannot in general be less than log n, though, so we are motivated to consider broad classes of games in which even sparser equilibria are guaranteed to exist.
Perhaps the simplest example is a 2-player games in which one player has only k available strategies, while the other player has n k available strategies. The results in the work of Lipton et al. [LMM03] imply there is a Nash equilibrium in this game with support size k + 1. This is somewhat unsatisfying -it means that in a two-player game one player may need to choose from less-sparse strategies than his opponent (i.e. requiring slightly more randomness) to achieve equilibrium. Theorem 1.4 rectifies this asymmetry by showing that k-sparse strategies suffice for the opposing player. Theorem 1.4 Let G = (R, C, k, n) be a two-player game. Given p * for which there exists a q * such that (p * , q * ) is a Nash equilibrium, we can compute in deterministic polynomial time q for which (p * , q ) is a Nash equilibrium and |supp(q )| ≤ k.
We also give a deterministic polynomial time algorithm to compute such a limited-support strategy for one player, given the k-sparse strategy of the other. We extend this further to the multiplayer case and show that for an -player game where players 1 through − 1 have k 1 , . . . , k −1 pure strategies, respectively, the -th player need only play a ( k i )-sparse strategy to achieve equilibrium:
. . , k −1 , n) be an -player game where
These bounds are tight.
Games of small rank
Perhaps the most significant technical contribution in this paper pertains to a generalization of the "unbalanced" games that we saw above, namely, games of small rank. This is a broad class of games (encompassing some natural examples -see Section 6.3) for which sparse equilibria are known to exist.
For 2-player games with rank-k payoff matrices, Lipton et al. describe an enumeration algorithm that finds (k + 1)-sparse strategies in O(n k+1 ) time. We improve dramatically on this bound but we must relax the problem in two ways: first, we compute an -equilibrium rather than an exact one; second we require that the payoff matrices be presented as a low-rank decomposition, with entries up to precision B (limited precision makes sense since we are only considering -equilibria). Theorem 1.6 Let G = (R, C, n) be a two player game such that R and C have rank at most k. Furthermore, let R = R 1 R 2 , C = C 1 C 2 be a decomposition of R, C with R 1 , R 2 , C 1 , C 2 containing integer entries in [−B, B]. Then, for every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure P running in time (4B 2 k/ ) 2k poly(|G|) that returns a 4 -Nash equilibrium (p, q) with |supp(p)|, |supp(q)| ≤ k + 1.
To the best of our knowledge, Theorem 1.6 provides the first efficient "fixed-parameter" algorithm to this problem in the sense that the running time is polynomial in the input size n and some function f (k, 1/ , B). The closest parallel to our result is by Kannan and Theobald [KT07] who consider a somewhat different definition of "rank" for two-player games: in their definition, the sum of the payoff matrices is required to have small rank. In that case, they present an algorithm that finds an -equilibrium in a rank k 2-player game in O(n 2k+o(1) B 2 ) time. Their algorithm relies on results of Vavasis for solving indefinite quadratic programs [Vav92] and does not seem to generalize to > 2 players.
Our algorithm is (arguably) simpler, and moreover, it easily generalizes to > 2 players, where small rank games still are guaranteed to have sparse equilibria. In the -player setting, we give an O(((2B) k / ) k ( −1) )poly(n ) time deterministic procedure that computes such a sparse -equilibrium, when the payoff tensors are presented as a rank-k decomposition with entries up to precision B.
All of the algorithms for low-rank games rely on enumerating potential equilibria distributions in a basis dictated by the small rank decomposition. This seems like a technique that may be useful for algorithmic questions regarding low-rank games beyond those we have considered in this paper.
Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes over some preliminary definitions and lemmas. Section 3 presents algorithms for finding small-support strategies for single-round games, obtaining approximate Nash equilibria. In Section 4, we look at the multiple-round case and present a randomness-efficient variant of the adaptive online algorithm of Freund and Schapire. Games in which some players have very few strategies are discussed in Section 5 while our new algorithms for -equilibria in games with small rank are described in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Definition 2.1 For a finite strategy set S we define ∆(S) to be the set of probability distributions over S, i.e, all vectors p = (p s ) s∈S satisfying s∈S p s = 1 with each p s ∈ [0, 1]. A mixed strategy p is an element of ∆(S). The support of a mixed strategy p ∈ ∆(S) is the set supp(p) given by supp(p) = {s ∈ S|p s > 0}. A mixed strategy p is k-sparse if |supp(p)| = k.
In this paper, we will concern ourselves with games that can be specified by payoff matrices (or tensors) whose entries denote the payoff upon playing the corresponding strategy tuple. We will also assume, unless otherwise specified, that these entries are bounded and can be scaled to lie in [−1, 1].
Definition 2.2 An -player finite game G is a tuple (T 1 , . . . , T , n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n ) where T i is the (n 1 ×. . .×n ) -dimensional payoff tensor with T i (s 1 , . . . , s ) denoting the payoff to player i when the pure strategy -tuple (s 1 , . . . , s ) is played in the game.
For ease of presentation, in the rest of this paper we will often restrict ourselves to -player games where n 1 = n 2 = . . . = n = n, which we denote by G = (T 1 , . . . , T , n). We often refer to players by their payoff tensors. For example, for the two-player game G = (R, C, n) we will refer to the row player as R and the column player as C. All vectors are thought of as row vectors.
Definition 2.3
In an -player game G = (T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T , n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n ), we denote by T i (p 1 , . . . , p ) the payoff to the i-th player when the players play mixed strategies p 1 , . . . , p , i.e.,
If we substitute some a ∈ [n j ] for p j we understand that to mean the distribution that places weight 1 on a and 0 everywhere else.
The following definition is standard:
Proof. Once we know the distributions p * 1 , . . . , p * −1 in order to find a Nash equilibrium strategy q for player T , we first determine the Nash equilibrium support for T by considering the set
We now find q satisfying the following linear program:
, we know that a solution to this linear program exists and this is the desired q.
Sparsifying Nash equilibria deterministically
In this section we give deterministic algorithms for "sparsifying" Nash equilibria (in the process turning them into -equilibria). In this way, a player with limited access to randomness, but who has access to an equilibrium mixed strategy, is able to produce a small strategy that can then be played. 
Two-players
Lipton et al proved:
Theorem 3.1 (Lipton et al) Let G = (R, C, n) be a two-player game, and let (p * , q * ) be a Nash equilibrium for G. There is a polynomial-time randomized procedure P such that with probability at least 1/2, the pair
The algorithm P is very simple: it amounts to sampling uniformly from the given equilibrium strategy. The analysis applies Chernoff bounds to show that the sampled strategies present the opposing players with approximately (within ) the same weighted row-and column-sums, and hence comprise an -equilibrium. In our setting, since the players have limited randomness they cannot afford the above sampling (it requires at least as much randomness as simply playing (p * , q * )), so we derandomize the algorithm using an expander walk. Theorem 1.1 (restated). Let G = (R, C, n) be a two-player game, and let (p * , q * ) be a Nash equilibrium for G. For every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure P running in time poly(|G|)
Before proving the theorem we will give a convenient characterization of -equilibrium:
Lemma 3.2 Let G = (R, C, n) be a 2-player game. Define
If supp(p) ⊆ S q and supp(q) ⊆ T p , then (p, q) is an -equilibrium for G.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary p ∈ ∆([n]). Since p Rq
T is a convex combination of the (Rq) j , it is at most max j (Rq) j . And, since p is a convex combination of the (Rq) j , with supp(p) ⊆ S q , we have pRq
We will use the Chernoff bound for random walks on an expander: Theorem 3.3 (Gillman [Gil93] ) Let H be an expander graph with second largest eigenvalue λ and vertex set V , and let f : V → [−1, 1] be arbitrary with E[f ] = µ. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t be the random variables induced by first picking X 1 uniformly in V and X 2 , . . . , X t by taking a random walk in H from X 1 . Then
Proof.
[Proof of Theorem 1.1] When we are given G and p * , we perform the following steps. First, construct a multiset S of [n] for which uniformly sampling from S approximates p * to within /n. This can be done with |S| ≤ O(n/ ). Denote byp the distribution induced by sampling uniformly from S. We identify S with the vertices of a constant-degree expander H, and we can sample S ⊆ S by taking a walk of length t = O(log n/ 2 ) steps in H. Note that this requires O(log |S| + O(t)) = O(log n/ 2 ) random bits. Let p be the probability distribution induced by sampling uniformly from S . By Theorem 3.3 (and using the fact that C has entries in [−1, 1]), for each fixed i,
(1)
By a union bound |(p C) i − (pC) i | ≤ for all i with non-zero probability. This condition can be checked given G, p * , and so we can derandomize the procedure completely by trying all choices of the random bits used in the expander walk.
When we are given G and q * , we perform essentially the same procedure (with respect to R and q * ), and in the end we output a pair p , q for which:
We claim that any such (p , q ) is an 4 -equilibrium, assuming (p * , q * ) are an equilibrium. Using the fact that C, R have entries in [−1, 1], and the fact that our multiset approximations to p * , q * have error at most /n in each coordinate, we obtain:
Define (as in Lemma 3.2):
, and hence w is in S q . We conclude that supp(p ) ⊆ S q . A symmetric argument shows that supp(q ) ⊆ T p . Applying Lemma 3.2, we conclude that (p , q ) is a 4 -equilibrium as required.
Since an equilibrium can be found efficiently by Linear Programming in the two player zero-sum case, we obtain as a corollary: Corollary 1.2 (restated). Let G = (R, C, n) be a two-player zero-sum game. For every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure running in time poly(|G|) 1/ 2 that outputs a pair (p * , q * ) that an O(log n/ 2 )-sparse -equilibrium for G.
Three or more players
We extend the algorithm above to make it work for games involving three or more players.
Theorem 3.4 Let G = (T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T , n) be an -player game, and let (p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * ) be a Nash equilibrium for G. For every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure P running in time poly(|G|)
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 1.1. When given (G, p *
2 ) strategies from player 1's multiset of strategies after identifying it with a constant-degree expander H and doing a t-step random walk on it. Let p 1 be the distribution obtained by sampling uniformly from the original multiset of strategies and p 1 the distribution induced by sampling from the t strategies picked from the random walk. For some fixing of (i 2 , . . . , i ) and j the Chernoff bound in (1) now becomes
By a union bound on all n −1 possible fixings for (i 2 , . . . , i ) and all j,
with positive probability. As before, we can derandomize the procedure completely by trying all choices of the random bits used in the expander walk. Essentially the same procedure gives us p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p . To show that ( p 1 , . . . , p ) constitute a 4 -equilibrium, consider the set S 1 = {i | T 1 (i, p 2 , . . . , p ) ≥ max i T 1 (i, p 2 , . . . , p ) − 4 }. Define S j analogously with respect to T j . It suffices to show that supp( p j ) ⊆ S j for all j. We sketch the argument for p 1 ; symmetric arguments hold with respect to p j for all j.
By the same thread of reasoning as in the two-player case, for any w ∈ supp( p 1 ),
Combining the two inequalities, we get
Limited randomness in repeated games
So far we have looked at optimizing the amount of randomness needed in single-round games where players execute their strategies only once. In this section, we investigate multiple-round games and in particular, the adaptive multiplicative weight algorithm of Freund and Schapire [FS99] for which we describe randomnessefficient modifications. In particular, we show that by using almost-pairwise independent random variables it is possible to achieve close to the same quality of approximation as in [FS99] .
Note that we make crucial use of the full power of [FS99] -i.e., their guarantee still holds if the column player changes his play in response to the particular randomness-efficient sampling being employed by the row player:
Let M be the n × n-payoff matrix for a two-player zero-sum T -round game with entries in {0, 1}. For any < 1/2 and constant δ, there exists an online randomized algorithm R using O(log n + log log T + log(1/ )) random bits with the following property: for any arbitrary sequence Q 1 , . . . , Q T of mixed strategies played (adaptively) by the column player over T rounds, R produces a sequence of strategies S 1 , . . . , S T such that with probability at least 1 − δ:
Proof. Our randomized online algorithm R is a modification of Freund and Schapire's multiplicative-weight adaptive algorithm [FS99] . For a game with payoff matrix M where both players have n strategies belonging to a strategy-set S, and for a sequence of mixed strategies (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P T ) over T rounds for the first player described by
where β = 1/(1 + 2 log n/T ), the Freund-Schapire algorithm offers the following guarantee on the expected payoff over T rounds:
Running the Freund-Schapire algorithm requires Ω(T log n) random bits in order to select a strategy from each distribution but we can optimize on this by using almost pairwise independent random variables.
As we did in the proof of Theorem 1.1 in Section 3.1, we can approximate any distribution P t by a uniform distribution S t drawn from a multiset of size O(n/ ) that approximates P t to within /n and suffer at most O( ) error. Therefore, under the uniform distribution over vertices s ∈ S i for all i = 1, . . . , T :
n be a sample space and X = x 1 . . . x n be chosen uniformly from Z n . Z n is (ρ, k)-independent if for any positions i 1 < i 2 < . . . < i k and any k-bit string t 1 . . . t k , we have
give efficient constructions of (ρ, k)-independent random variables over {0, 1} n that we can suitably adapt to obtain T (ρ, 2)-independent random variables S 1 , . . . , S T over a larger alphabet of size O(n/ ) using O(log n + log(1/ρ) + log(1/ ) + log log T ) random bits.
The following lemma is key to the remainder of the proof and a proof of the lemma follows immediately afterwards.
Lemma 4.3 Let S 1 , . . . , S T be (ρ, 2)-independent random variables. Then, for any δ:
Setting ρ = O(δ 6 /n 2 ) in Lemma 4.3 gives us:
Therefore with probability at least 1 − δ over the choice of randomness of S 1 , . . . ,
Finally by application of Lemma 4.1 we have with probability at least 1 − δ
Note that by our choice of ρ, we require O(log n + log log T + log(1/ )) random bits. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof. (Of Lemma 4.
3) The proof is essentially a variation of the Chebyshev tail inequality for (δ, 2) independent random variables. Let
We bound σ 2 (Z) as follows:
(There are at most (n/ ) possible strategies in the multisets S i , S j )
Substituting in (6) and setting λ =
we get the desired inequality.
Unbalanced games
In this section we will look at what happens when one of the players (perhaps as a consequence of having limited randomness) is known to have very few -k -available strategies, while the other player has n k available strategies. In such a game does there exist a k-sparse strategy for the second player? We prove that this is indeed the case. The main technical tool we'll need is Carathéodory's Theorem. Since many of the results we obtain depend on the constructive feature of the theorem we record below such a proof. 
Proof. We write a linear combination involving the
for some arbitrary t that we shall define later. Let β l = − n−1 j=1 β j . Adding (8), (9) we get
Now, we set t = min j −α j /β j , say without loss of generality −α 1 /β 1 . Rewriting (10),
Furthermore, (α j − α 1 β j /β 1 ) > 0 for all j = 2, . . . , l and n j=2 (α j − α 1 β j /β 1 ) = 1. Hence, we have expressed v as a convex combination in (n − 1) vectors from {v 1 , . . . , v n }. We proceed in this manner, until we are no longer able to write a linear combination in k vectors as was done in (9). This procedure takes poly(n) time.
The main theorem in this section is below. We state it for two players for simplicity, and extend it to players later. Theorem 1.4 (restated). Let G = (R, C, k, n) be a two-player game. Given p * for which there exists a q * such that (p * , q * ) is a Nash equilibrium, we can compute in deterministic polynomial time q for which (p * , q ) is a Nash equilibrium and |supp(q )| ≤ k.
Proof. We would like to apply Carathéodory's Theorem as was done to obtain a similar result in [LMM03] but we will need to modify our application since Carathéodory's Theorem applies to linear subspaces whereas the Nash equilibrium strategies define an affine subspace. By Lemma 2.5 given G, p * we can construct a q such that (p * , q) is also a Nash equilibrium. Consider the column vector u given by
where m i is the i-th column vector in R. Since R is a k × n matrix, u is in the span of column vectors m 1 , . . . , m n that lie in a k-dimensional subspace of R k . Since (p * , q) is a Nash-equilibrium, for all i ∈ supp(q):
This is an additional linear constraint on the m i s and hence m 1 , . . . , m n lie in a (k − 1)-dimensional affine subspace A. Since u is a convex combination of the m i 's,
and hence u also lies in A. Define m i = m i − w * 1 k , where 1 k is the all-ones column vector. Then for all i ∈ supp(q), p * m i = 0. Therefore
lies in a (k − 1)-dimensional subspace of R k . Applying Carathéodory's theorem 5.1, u can thus be rewritten as a convex combination:
where |supp(q )| ≤ k. It follows that
We claim that (p * , q ) is the desired Nash equilibrium. This is true because supp(q ) ⊆ supp(q * ), and for each
The following theorem extends the result above to the general -player game where − 1 players play sparse strategies.
Corollary 1.5 (restated).
Let G = (T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T , k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k −1 , n) be an -player game where
. . , p * −1 there exists a deterministic polynomial-time procedure to compute p such that
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.4. Applying Lemma 2.5, we obtain p such that (p * 1 , . . . , p * −1 , p ) is a Nash equilibrium for G. Consider the k × n matrix T − formed by choosing each of T 1 , . . . , T −1 's strategies. T − is of rank at most k < n. As in proving Theorem 1.4, we observe that the column vector u = T − p is in the span of column vectors m 
Proof. (Sketch) For each T i ; i = 1, . . . , we set values as follows. For some lexicographical ordering of J = {(v 1 , . . . , v −1 ) | 1 ≤ v r ≤ k r ; 1 ≤ r ≤ − 1} given by α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k we set
Let (p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * ) be the mixed strategy -tuple where for each i = 1, . . . , −1 p * i is the uniform distribution on the set of strategies
. . , p * ) specifies a Nash equilibrium for G. This is easy to see since the payoff to T i upon playing p * i in response to (p * 1 , . . . , p * i−1 , p * i+1 , . . . , p * ) is 1/k for i = 1, . . . , and 0 for any other strategy. Hence, T i has no incentive to deviate unilaterally to any other strategy that will increase his payoff. Since this holds true for all i = 1, . . . , (p * 1 , . . . , p * ) is a Nash equilibrium. Next, suppose that T decides to play a strategy with support k < k = −1 i=1 k i . Then, there is some 1 ≤ j < k such that j is not included in T 's support. Corresponding to j is some (v * 1 , . . . , v * −1 ) according to the lexicographical ordering described above. By leaving out v * i from its support and redistributing that weight onto other strategies, T i has increased its payoff from 1/k to 1/k . Hence such a strategy cannot be an equilibrium.
6 Finding sparse -equilibria in low-rank games
We now consider games of rank k, which is a significant generalization of the "unbalanced" games in the previous section. Indeed, rank k games are perhaps the most general class of games for which sparse equilibria are guaranteed to exist. In this section we give algorithms to compute sparse -equilibria in this setting.
Two player case
Since we are computing -equilibria, we only expect the game specification to be given up to some fixed precision. We will be working with rank k matrices M expressed as M 1 M 2 (where M 1 is a n × k matrix and M 2 is a k × n matrix). Such a decomposition can be found efficiently via basic linear algebra. In the following theorem we take M 1 and M 2 , specified up to fixed precision, as our starting point.
2 As the example in §6.3 illustrates, such a decomposition is already available for many natural games. Our convention for expressing fixed precision entries will be to require them to be integers in the range [−B, B] for a bound B.
Theorem 1.6 (restated).
Let G = (R, C, n) be a two player game such that R and C have rank at most k. Furthermore, let R = R 1 R 2 , C = C 1 C 2 be a decomposition of R, C with R 1 , R 2 , C 1 , C 2 containing integer entries in [−B, B]. Then, for every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure P running in time (4B 2 k/ ) 2k poly(|G|) that returns a 4 -Nash equilibrium (p, q) with |supp(p)|, |supp(q)| ≤ k + 1.
Lipton et al. showed that there exist (k + 1)-sparse Nash equilibria in this setting and this implies an enumeration algorithm to find an equilibrium in time approximately n k+1 poly(|G|). Our algorithm shows that the problem is "fixed parameter tractable" [Ces05, DF99, DFS97] where , the rank k and precision B are the parameters.
Proof. Note that the payoff to the row-player when (p, q) is the strategy tuple for the game which is given by pRq T can now be written as pR 1 R 2 q T and likewise for the column player. The first step in our algorithm is to "guess" a collection of vectors to within δ = /(2Bk) precision. We describe the "correct" guess relative to an (arbitrary) Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) for G. Let p * = p * C 1 , q * = R 2 q * T . Note that from our choice of
The algorithm is as follows:
1. Guess ap such that for all i = 1, . . . , k |p * i −p i | ≤ δ. Similarly, guessq such that for all i = 1, . . . , k
Find a feasible solutionp to the following linear program
and a feasible solutionq to the analogous linear program in which the first set of constraints is
4. v =pC 1 is a convex combination of the rows of C 1 , all of which lie in a k-dimensional subspace. From Carathéodory's Theorem (Theorem 5.1), we can findp with supp(p) ⊆ supp(p) for which |supp(p)| ≤ k+1 and v =pC 1 .
Similarly u = R 2q
T is a convex combination of the columns of R 2 , all of which lie in a k-dimensional subspace. Applying Carathéodory's Theorem again, we findq with supp(q) ⊆ supp(q) for which |supp(q)| ≤ k + 1 and u = R 2q T .
6. Returnp,q.
Correctness follows from the next two claims:
Claim 6.1 A feasible solution to the linear programs formulated in step 3 of the algorithm exists.
Proof. (Of Claim 6.1) We claim that if (p * , q * ) is a Nash equilibrium for G thenp = p * is a feasible solution to the first LP andq = q * is a feasible solution to the second LP. Assumep andq are the correct guesses. We need to show that supp(p * ) ⊆ T and supp(q * ) ⊆ S. Sincẽ p is a correct guess, p * = p * C 1 satisfies |p * j −p j | ≤ δ. Therefore, p * satisfies (13). Similarly forq we have |q * j −q j | ≤ δ and so q * satisfies (13) in the LP for q. Consider r ∈ supp(p * ) and (R 1q T ) r . Since |q j − q * j | ≤ /(2Bk) for all j = 1, . . . , k, we get
Moreover p * is a Nash equilibrium strategy and r ∈ supp(p * ). Therefore,
Combining (17) and (18),
and the right hand side can be simplified to yield:
Hence r ∈ T and supp(p * ) ⊆ T . Similarly, we can show that supp(q * ) ⊆ S.
Claim 6.2 (p,q) as returned by the algorithm is a 4 -equilibrium.
Lemma 6.5 Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ∈ R k be vectors satisfying |x i − x i | ≤ δ and furthermore, let | x i | ≤ B for all i = 1, . . . , . Then,
. . .
The other side of the inequality can be similarly shown.
We begin by generalizing Lipton et al. [LMM03] to the multiplayer case. The following theorem shows that low rank games in the multiplayer case have sparse Nash equilibria; in the next section we give nontrivial algorithms to find approximate equilibria with this sparsity.
Corollary 6.6 Let G = (T 1 , . . . , T , n) be an -player game, and suppose T i has rank k i . Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (p * 1 , . . . , p * ) with |supp(p *
Proof. Let (q 1 , . . . , q ) be a Nash equilibrium for G and let (C i,1 , . . . , C i, ) be the tensor decomposition for T i . Given q 1 , . . . , q , we can define vectors in R n :
By the definition of a Nash equilibrium, the following conditions are satisfied:
And indeed any ( q 1 , . . . , q ) satisfying these conditions (when the w i are defined relative the the q i ) is a Nash equilibrium. Set s = j=1 k j . Now, by Carathéodory's Theorem there exists q 1 ∈ R n with supp( q 1 ) ⊆ supp(q 1 ) and |supp( q 1 )| ≤ s + 1 for which:
since the right-hand-side is a convex combination of vectors in R s for s ≤ s. Similarly, there exists q 2 ∈ R n with supp( q 2 ) ⊆ supp(q 2 ) and |supp( q 2 )| ≤ s + 1 for which:
since the right-hand-side is a convex combination of vectors in R s for s ≤ s. A symmetric argument gives us a sparse q i from each q i . Moreover, these q i produce precisely the same vectors w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w via (21). And, since supp( q i ) ⊆ supp(q i ) for all i, the strategies q i satisfy the above conditions for being a Nash equilibrium, assuming the original q i did.
We now turn to algorithms for finding sparse approximate equilibria, with three or more players. We first consider the case when the tensor decomposition is known. This is not an unnatural assumption: in §6.3, we describe a class of games for which the tensor decomposition is naturally given by the description of the payoff functions.
Theorem 6.7 Let G = (T 1 , . . . , T , n) be an -player game, and suppose we are given a k-decomposition of T i = (C i1 , . . . , C i ) where each of the C ij is an n × k matrix with integer values in [−B, B] for i, j = 1, . . . , . Then for every > 0, there is a deterministic procedure P running in time
that returns a 4 -Nash equilibrium (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p ) with |supp(p i )| ≤ 1 + k for all i.
Proof. As in the two player case, our first step is to "guess" a collection of vectors to within δ = k (2B) −1 precision. We describe the "correct" guess relative to an (arbitrary) Nash equilibrium (p 1 , . . . , p ) for G. 
3. For C 11 (r), the r-th row in C 11 let
4. By repeating steps 1 through 3 on T 2 , . . . , T we can similarly obtain S 2 , . . . , S .
5. Find (p 1 , . . . ,p ) satisfying the following linear program
6. Let 7. Return ( p 1 , . . . , p ).
As before, in order to prove the correctness of the above algorithm we postulate the following claims:
Claim 6.8 A feasible solution to the linear program formulated in step 5 of the algorithm exists.
The total number of guesses made in step 2. of the procedure is k( − 1) (k guesses for each component of the ( − 1) different vectors in step 2, repeated times in step 4.). Each component is within [−B, B] and is guessed to δ accuracy, so the guessing takes time
For each guess, we solve a linear program, taking time poly(|G|), for a total running time as claimed. This completes the proof of the theorem.
6.3 An example of games with known low-rank tensor decomposition Many natural games are specified implicitly (rather than by explicitly giving the tensors) by describing the payoff function, which itself is often quite simple. In such cases, the tensor ranks may be significantly smaller than n, and moreover, a low-rank decomposition into components with bounded entries can often be derived from the payoff functions. One prominent example is simple -player congestion games as described in [FPT04, Pap05] . Such a game is based on a graph G(V, E) with n vertices and m edges. Each player's strategy set corresponds to a subset S p ⊆ 2 E , the set of all subsets of edges. We define the payoff accruing to some strategy l-tuple (s 1 , . . . , s ) as U (s 1 , . . . , s ) = − e c e (s 1 , . . . , s ) where c e (s 1 , . . . , s ) = |{i|e ∈ s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ }| is thought of as the congestion on paths s 1 , . . . , s . Let G = (T 1 , . . . , T , N = 2 m ) be the game corresponding to the situation described above where for i = 1, . . . , and strategy tuple (s 1 , . . . , s ), T i (s 1 , . . . , s ) = − e c e (s 1 , . . . , s ). Theorem 6.10 For i = 1, . . . , T i as defined above is of rank at most m. Furthermore, an explicit mdecomposition (C i1 , C i2 , . . . , C i ) for T i exists where C ij are n × k matrices with entries in {−1, 0, 1}.
Proof. In order to give an m-decomposition of T 1 say, we need to construct (C 1 , . . . , C ) where C i , i = 1, . . . , are n × ( m) matrices. Consider the tensors {T i,j } i=1,..., ,j=1,...,m that are described as follows: fix some s i to be the strategy for player i. For all e j ∈ E(G), j = 1, . . . , m such that e j ∈ s i let T i,j (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i , s i+1 , . . . , s ) = −1 where s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s ∈ 2 E . Then, T 1 = i=1 m j=1 T i,j . This follows easily since each tuple (s 1 , . . . , s ) in some T i,j contributes −1 to T 1 (s 1 , . . . , s ) iff e j ∈ s i . Summing over all T i,j for i = 1, . . . , , e j contributes exactly −c ej (s 1 , . . . , s ) to T 1 (s 1 , . . . , s ) from the definition of c ej (s 1 , . . . , s ) above. Summing over all j = 1, . . . , m we obtain the total contribution from all the edges. Next, we claim that each T i,j is a rank-1 tensor. Indeed, T i,j = v 1,j ⊗ . . . ⊗ v ,j where v k,j = 1 N the all-ones N × 1 column vector for k = 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , and v i,j is the N × 1 column vector given by:
−1 e j ∈ s k ; 0 otherwise.
for k = 1, . . . , N .
Conclusions
There are many other interesting questions that are raised by viewing game theory through the lens of requiring players to be randomness-efficient. In this paper, we have framed some of the initial questions that arise and have provided answers to several of them. In particular, we have exploited the extensive body of work in derandomization to construct deterministic algorithms for finding sparse -equilibria (which can be played with limited randomness), and for playing repeated games while reusing randomness across rounds. The efficient fixed-parameter algorithms we describe for finding -equilibria in games of small rank significantly improve over the standard enumeration algorithm, and to the best of our knowledge, they are the first such results for games of small rank. The notion of resource-limited players has been an extremely useful one in game theory, and we think that it is an interesting and natural question in this context to consider the case in which the limited computational resource is randomness. These considerations expose a rich and largely untapped area straddling complexity theory and game theory.
